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Phoenix Pakistan?
 Putting claim and realities in the right equation 
The current statements of Pakistani authorities make it seem like the country is 
finally experiencing a shift towards a comprehensive improvement after decades 
of endemic violence, political turmoil, as well as declining social and economic 
conditions. Several indicators are put forward to backup this proclaimed 
‘turnaround’:  
Firstly, there are trends pointing towards an apparently overall positive economic 
development. The Pakistani Stock Exchange (PSX) provided a performance of 
46 per cents in return last year. It is expected that the GDP will grow by 4.7 per 
cent in 2017. Furthermore, the inflation rate is on a ‘moderate level’ of 3.66 
percent in January this year (the average rate during the last 6 decades was 7.85 
percent); the consumer spending will be boosted by a burgeoning middle class 
and there is a ‘staggering fall’ of Pakistani living in poverty. Most importantly, 
the country is witnessing the launch and implementation of numerous Chinese-
supported energy and infrastructure projects within the framework of the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion dollar development 
initiative. Said Economic Corridor is getting heralded as a ‘game changer’ away 
from Pakistan’s past unfortunate economic and social trajectories. 
Secondly, due to the fact that two-thirds	 of the CPEC-related projects are 
energy related, Pakistani officials are announcing that the country solved its 
energy crisis. Until now, the shortages in energy supply resulted in long-
lasting power cuts which severely hampered the country’s economic 
development. 
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Thirdly, Pakistani authorities carried out several joint efforts to improve the counter-terrorism 
effort. This task was tackled through the formulation of the National Action Plan (NAP), the 
temporary creation of military courts, the set-up of Army-run de-radicalization centres, the 
establishment of so called APEX Committees to support the implementation of NAP (and 
subsequently CPEC), large-scale military campaigns such as Operation Zarb-e-Azb or the 
recently launched Operation Radd-al-Fasaad, as well as the set-up of new military units solely 
dedicated to protect CPEC implementation and related projects. In order to prove the success of 
these measures, military and civilians often refer to their own statistical data demonstrating a 
significant quantitative drop-down in terrorist incidents and casualties (independent sources are 
not available). The rationale behind this rhetoric is to give the impression that Pakistan is able to 
ensure a safe environment for foreign investments and businesses. 
Fourthly, after accomplishing the first transition of power from one elected government (with 
accomplished term) to another during the 2013 general election, Islamabad states that it finally 
reached the path towards the consolidation of democracy. Pakistan is thus attempting to reduce 
its negative image of being a ‘quasi failed state’.  
These undeniably positive developments are temporary ‘snapshots’ and the question remains of 
how sustainable these trajectories are. For much enthusiasm is shown for selected macro-
economic indicators or achievements regarding democracy and internal security, they are hardly 
reflected by the realities on the ground.   
For example, while the performance of the Pakistani stock market PSX is indeed remarkable, the 
statistic (like in many other countries) is more about ‘premature praises’, speculations, and 
‘shareholder-value’ than concrete increases of existing ‘economic mass’ of the respected PLCs 
(Public Limited Companies). Furthermore, despite the rising middle class and the progress in 
reducing poverty, there are still around 60 million people living beyond the poverty line. 
Additionally, until today Pakistan was not able to benefit much from any major trade agreements 
signed, neither from the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement nor from the Generalised Scheme 
of Preferences (GSP-Plus) with the European Union. 
Regarding CPEC one must state that along with the expected positive impacts there are critical 
voices pointing out that a lack of national consensus and harmony among the provinces and 
other disadvantaged areas with regard to Islamabad’s handling of the initiative. Conflict is 
especially visible between Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federal 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on one side, and Punjab (and partly Sindh) on the other side; 
 2
 
 COMMENT
differences also naturally exist between the regions and the federal government. The following 
complains relating to implementation have been put into the forefront by some regions: no 
adequate inclusion of regions in decision-making processes; exploitation of regional resources 
without adequate remuneration; land grabbing; (forced) displacement of local people and guided 
internal migration aimed at changing the social demography in restive regions (especially in 
Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan), and severe distortion of fair and free economic competition. It 
can thus be reasoned that the CPEC enforces already existing centre-regions conflicts, and 
intensifies socio-political unrest and protest movements. The increasing local resistance against 
CPEC will constitute a severe challenge the current and future stability and security in the 
country. Furthermore, there is the major problem relating to the fact that the CPEC is to be 
developed on disputed territories such as the area of Gilgit-Baltistan. This area got illegally 
acquired and subsequently administered by Pakistan. This is an important fact since all the 
CPEC infrastructure projects have to run through this territory, the only land connection between 
China and Pakistan. Thus not only is the political status of Gilgit-Baltistan unclear, but also the 
whole CPEC lacks legal standing since it does not comply with numerous international 
agreements, including a number of relevant UN resolutions. 
The claim by Pakistan’s authorities that the country’s energy crisis is solved must also be put in 
perspective.  
Firstly, apart from some investments in renewable energies, many of the immediate ‘early 
harvest’ (CPEC priority) energy projects are in the area of coal. Here, it is interesting to note that 
Pakistan is not only buying old, out-dated coal-fired power plants from China but also is forced 
to import coal (at least for the next years) necessary to run them. This revival of coal-based 
energy production is surprising: while the world tries to move away, Pakistan goes towards coal 
regardless of the severe, unfortunate consequences for the country’s environment. This is 
increasingly significant because Pakistan is already suffering tremendously from the negative 
impacts of climate change. The disastrous 2010 flood is just one dramatic example of the lack of 
awareness among, and misguided energy and environmental policy led by, the country’s 
leadership. 
Secondly, one should also mention that Chinese companies are starting to bow out of projects 
(e.g. the energy project on coal at Pind Daden Khan in Punjab’s Salt Range) because of their 
economic (lack of) feasibility. The expected hike in the price for coal -especially due to the Paris 
climate deal- will most likely add to future financial burdens. Looking at the financial aspects of 
the CPEC in general and related energy projects in particular one must point at several crucial 
points: at the moment, a serious debate about the fact that Chinese investments are loans and 
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have to be repaid did not happen yet. Consequently, there are no concrete financial plans (at least 
publicly available) concerning the issue of how Islamabad is planning to address the country’s 
upcoming monetary obligations and how these costs will be distributed between the different 
actors, especially between centre and the regions. The fact that Pakistan’s national finances 
suffer from the lack of an adequate system for tax collection (only one per cent of the total 
population are filling out their income tax returns and paying subsequent taxes) as well as from a 
‘remarkable bad-payment behaviour and moral’--especially when it comes to the settlement of 
electricity bills or the systematic thievery of electricity--are additional challenges which are not 
being sufficiently addressed yet. The fact that many of these energy projects are run by Chinese 
companies is another serious problem. Here, one must expect that much of “the income gained 
by selling the generated electricity will flow out of Pakistan”. Furthermore, since many CPEC 
projects are implemented by Chinese firms and workers using Chinese machinery and material, 
Pakistan has to face an additional capital drain. In sum, CPEC will lead Pakistan to a major debt 
problem while failing to address the ‘real roots’ of its energy crisis.  
Also in the context of security and terrorism the mismatch between official claims based on 
statistical data and the concrete realities is obvious. Within Pakistan’s security circles there was 
much appraisal (especially via government and military-guided media promotion) about the 
latest efforts of the country’s armed forces in combating terrorism, especially regarding the 
efforts of former COAS Raheel Sharif. 
Here, the recent wave of terrorist attacks killing more than 110 people within a week --namely 
the suicide attack at the popular shrine of Sufi saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in the town of 
Sehwan in Sindh province on February 16, the IED (improvised explosive device) attack on a 
military convoy in Arawan (Balochistan) on February 16, or the bombing in the north-western 
town of Tangi on February 21--are standing in sharp contrast with Islamabad’s the statements 
regarding the success of its counter-terrorism measures and the country’s safety regarding 
foreign investment and even tourism. It emphasises that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism measures 
remain inefficient. Despite the numbers, the recent great damage shows that the terrorists are still 
able to challenge the state wherever and whenever they want.  
A major reason for this reality is the country’s double-standard in fighting terrorism: on one side 
Pakistan applies much effort to fight domestic militancy directed against its own state 
institutions and society, but on the other side the government continues its decades-long 
sponsorship of cross-border Jihadists, especially those operating in India and Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the different branches of governance--not only the executive but the judiciary too--
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are applying an extraordinary appeasement policy towards ultra-conservative, radicalised 
Islamist groups. One of the latest examples of this policy was the banning of Valentine’s Day 
and the subsequent cracking down on those planning to celebrate it. The move to abandon this 
‘cultural event’ was an obvious attempt “to appease Islamist groups”. It is noteworthy that the 
decision to ban Valentine’s Day was made by the Islamabad High Court.  
During the last years the judiciary was able to establish itself as a relative independent element 
of the institutional setup of Pakistan, especially in relation to the legislative branch, but also 
partly in relation to the executive. This development was appreciated as a significant step 
towards the strengthening of the notion of ‘balance of powers’ in the country’s political system. 
However, the recent happenings such as the ban of the Valentine’s Day or the earlier permission 
to establish military courts (accompanied by the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty,	
thus	 turning the country into one of the world’s leading executioners) shows that Pakistan’s 
judiciary has its very own history and, more importantly, agenda. Here, one must be aware that 
the Valentine’s Day’s ban is not a single incident but rather the continuation of a long-term 
trajectory of limiting public space for liberal and secular thinking and acting. The stand of the 
judiciary in the ‘Facebook affair’ in 2010 (facebook was blocked after proclaimed anti-Islamic 
activities of some of its members) or its inactive (sometimes even supportive) role regarding the 
illegal application of “blasphemy practices” are other stunning examples revealing the ‘Islamist 
soft-corner’ of Pakistan’s judiciary. As such, there is no doubt that there is not only a certain 
‘traditional affinity’ between the judges and the military but also an “open support” for Islamists 
from the judges’ side. 
Last but not least, it becomes apparent that the much-hailed democratic consolidation too 
appears as a delusive semblance as soon as one looks beyond the technical aspects of holding 
elections for a regular transfer of power as happened during 2013 national elections. Many 
celebrated this shift as a positive sign of democratic consolidation. However, the appreciation of 
this allegedly ‘new democratic impetus’ ignores the resilience of decade-old authoritarian and 
anti-democratic patterns. The military still dominates all significant political decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, due to certain requirements (ensuring security, stability and national 
consensus) necessary for the implementation of the CPEC, the soldiers were able to further 
entrench their formal role in the political-institutional setup. This seriously challenges the notion 
of civilian supremacy, which is unfortunate since civilian control of the armed forces is a 
necessary constituent for democracy and democratic consolidation. Thus one can state that in 
order to guarantee a secure environment for the CPEC development, the government granted the 
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army an ever more formal role in the country’s political system. In addition, the army pushed for 
the establishment of so-called Apex Committees, constituting a quasi-parallel administrative 
structure sidelining the executive and legislative on the national and provincial level in all 
matters regarding the CPEC development. The military dominated Apex Committees quickly 
emerged as the most important institution in the current structure of governance.  The military 
argue projects like the CPEC can affect all spheres of life, and therefore should be controlled by 
these special committees. Recent decisions regarding the launch, duration, range and goals of the 
major military operation, like Zarb-e-Azb or Radd-al-Fasaad were all done autonomously by the 
military themselves. Also, the decision about building up new Special Forces in Sindh and 
Balochistan was done by the military, civilians being consulted (rather briefed) only afterwards. 
In sum one can state that today and due to the CPEC project the army has the strongest formal 
(institutionalised) role in the country’s political system ever in its history. In other words, the 
military possesses so much political power that it’s free to carry out a coup d’état and run the 
affairs of the state if it so chooses. 
That Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain spared time for announcing that Valentine’s Day 
constitutes an “un-Islamic tradition” instead of focusing on the struggle against the Islamisation 
of the society completes the prostration of the state in relation to Jihadist groups. However, that 
this approach is backfiring can be seen in the ongoing Jihadist attacks targeting not only people 
protesting the ban of Valentine’s Day but also courthouses as was the case during the recent 
bombing in Tangi. This is a serious challenge to the country’s political-administrative institutions 
as well as the fundamental rights of the people and undermines the flourishing of democratic 
norms and values. Furthermore, it’s creating an atmosphere in which Jihadi ideology can spread 
and jihadist organisations like Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) are able to build up a huge infrastructure 
inside Pakistan. That Pakistani authorities don’t have the political will to act against individuals 
and organisations actively calling for and supporting ‘Global Jihad’ is further favouring the 
entrenchment of Jihadism in Pakistani society. For example, instead of bringing JuD leader 
Muhammad Hafez Saeed, UN and US-designated global terrorist and one of the world’s most 
wanted person, to justice for its Jihadist activities abroad (like the 2008 Mumbai attack and the 
assault at the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in 2001), he was ‘only’ put under house arrest. 
This measure can be interpreted as an half-hearted attempt to act against Jihadists in order to 
avoid US sanctions and/or to address Chinese demands to ensure domestic security for the 
CPEC. However, the ‘house arrest’ of Hafez Saeed is described by Pakistani officials as an act of 
‘national interest’. Yet apparently what the country’s military proclaims as ‘national interests’ 
seems to be in sharp contrast to what the international community expects from Pakistan, namely 
the expectation for the country to end its state-sponsored terrorism and to combat ‘Global 
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Jihadism’. This situation can be also captured with the words of Ayesha Siddiqa: “This may 
serve the purpose of signalling to the world the state’s ability to control these elements but it is 
not a precursor to a strategic change, especially at a time when the geo-political plate seems to 
be in flux. At this juncture, militant groups may be viewed as vital assets that could even be 
loaned to big but friendly players in the Great Game.” Additionally, apart from continuing to use 
cross-border terrorists as an instrument in its foreign policy towards Afghanistan and India, an 
important reason for Pakistan’s appeasement towards Jihadists is that it tries not to become their 
targets. In order words, Pakistani authorities perceive as ‘national interests’ not to target 
terrorists which are known as ‘friendly’ or at least ‘neutral’, meaning not a threat towards 
Pakistan itself. 
Against this backdrop, the latest counter-terrorist activities like the launch of Operation Radd-al-
Fasaad are also not indicating a stop to Pakistan’s support of cross-border Jihadists. The fact that 
this military campaign is focusing on the Punjab region, which was  largely spared by earlier 
counter-terrorism measures due to political reasons (stronghold of the government and home of 
many senior army personnel), does not mean that the ongoing campaign will target 
internationally acting terrorists. Rather it seems that the military actions are only aiming at the 
eradication of groups supporting militancy within Pakistan’s own borders as well as controlling 
regional opposition against the CPEC. The latter is perceived as ‘anti-national’, even if it’s non-
violent.  
Final thoughts 
The February 2017 wave of terror attacks by new terrorist alliances shows that neither the ‘carrot 
and stick approach’ towards domestic acting fanatic Islamists nor the appeasement of 
internationally acting terrorists is working. Furthermore, recent developments in international 
politics are indicating that the US will not anymore tolerate Pakistan ambiguous stand regarding 
counter-terrorism. In this context, China might also reconsider its policy of diplomatic-backing 
of Pakistani-based Jihadists. If it continues to block international efforts to fight against Jihadism 
originating from Pakistani soil it will make Beijing complicit in terrorism. This is gaining 
significances since China is trying to convince states all over the Eurasia region to participate in 
its major development project, called One Belt, One Road (OBOR, also known as New Silk 
Road). However, the fact that Chinese diplomats were backing Pakistani-based cross-border 
terrorism targeting states which are also supposed to be partners in OBOR (especially India) will 
lead to a severe questioning of Beijing’s claim that OBOR is guided by the notion of ‘mutual 
benefits’. Furthermore, it will not lead to build trust among governments which are already 
suspicious regarding the political and security-related implications of the Chinese-initiated and 
‘guided’ New Silk Road. The latter phenomenon will be especially prevalent among European 
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countries struggling with a tremendous increase of Jihadist networks and incidents. These factors 
might create the momentum for Chinese strategic thinkers to reassess certain aspects of their 
relations with Pakistan, especially the CPEC. Here, despite the significance of the CPEC for 
OBOR and the Sino-Pakistani ‘All-Weather-Friendship’, Beijing will hardly allow Pakistani 
policies and the CPEC to turn into stumbling blocks in the way of its overall New Silk Road 
initiative. In consequence, as long as the Pakistani elite do not change its mindset regarding its 
country’s state sponsorship of terrorism and pampering of Jihadism, there will be no sustainable 
improvements either in the economic sphere or in the social and political ones. 
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